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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
PROFESSOR KATSORIS: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen.
On behalf of the DeStefano Family, I’d like to welcome you here
tonight. For those of you who never met Al DeStefano, let me briefly
describe him to you. He started at Fordham Law School as an evening
student, worked during the day, still managed to make the Law Review,
and graduated at the top of his class. He then went on to become a
partner in the Becker firm, specializing in corporate matters, particularly
mergers and acquisitions. In his spare time, he devoted himself to
numerous charitable endeavors and, as an adjunct professor on our
faculty, shared his enormous knowledge and experience with our
students.
Former Dean of Fordham Law School and current Federal Circuit
Judge Joseph McLaughlin, truly a great teacher in his own right, when
once asked to describe the duties of a law professor, responded without
hesitation: “He must be thoroughly versed in every aspect of the
material and his role is not in creating more academics, but rather
scrappy, smart lawyers who are ethical and engaged.” I’m proud to say
that Al DeStefano is just such a lawyer, and I might add the word
compassionate as well.
Indeed, I personally feel that the goal of the DeStefano Lecture
series is to follow the McLaughlin rule, that is, to communicate with
scrappy, smart lawyers who are ethical and engaged on topics of current
interest. In keeping with this tradition since its inception over a decade
ago, the DeStefano Lectures have covered a wide range of timely and
diverse topics such as: the need for market regulation; the demise of
Enron and its auditor Arthur Anderson; strengthening the protection for
investors; making our capital markets more transparent; the subprime
mortgage meltdown; and corporate and governmental accountability.
Last year, we were treated to Judge Rakoff’s thought-provoking
lecture, entitled “Are Federal Judges Competent? Dilettantes in an Age
of Economic Expertise.” Tonight we’re in for another treat. Tonight’s
speaker will cover the topic “Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil.”
Interestingly, it was exactly one hundred years ago, 1912, that Professor
I. Maurice Wormser, of the Fordham faculty, wrote his famous article
in the Columbia Law Review regarding piercing the corporate veil,
where he analyzed various situations in which the concept of corporate
entities should be ignored and the veil of limited liability lifted.
Professor Wormser was a legend at Fordham Law School. Indeed,
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although he was truly an outstanding academician, he also fit the
McLaughlin definition of being a smart, scrappy lawyer who was both
ethical and involved. Why did such a giant in the law choose the
Columbia Law Review to launch his famous doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil? There are several theories.
The first is a simple explanation. The Fordham Law Review was
not yet in existence. It began publication two years later in 1914 and
Professor Wormser could not wait to issue his theory. Another
explanation is somewhat more complex. Professor Wormser knew the
Columbia Law Review was then, and would continue to be, one of the
leading premier legal periodicals; and, he had a premonition that one
hundred years later a professor from the Columbia School of Journalism
would pick up the torch of justice in search of abuses by those who hide
behind the corporate veil. Does that sound far-fetched? Perhaps. But to
me, the connection between piercing the corporate veil one hundred
years ago and those who have lurked behind the corporate veil this past
century seems compelling and more than just a coincidence. I wish I
could add that tonight’s speaker was a collateral descendant of Professor
Wormser, but that would be wishful thinking.
In any event, fraud, deception, misrepresentation, and perjury have
occurred in the business community since Professor Wormser’s article a
century ago. There is no one more qualified to report on that subject
than tonight’s speaker, who will discuss those who hide behind the
corporate veil.
James Stewart was born in Quincy, Illinois. He graduated from
DePauw University and Harvard Law School. He is the Bloomberg
Professor of Business Journalism at Columbia University Graduate
School of Journalism. He writes the Common Sense column for the
Business Day section of the New York Times. He contributes regularly
to The New Yorker, and he was formerly Page 1 Editor of The Wall
Street Journal.
His awards are too numerous to list, but I will highlight just a few.
He is the recipient of the 1988 Pulitzer Prize for The Wall Street Journal
articles on the 1987 stock market crash and insider trading scandal. He
is a winner of the George Polk award and several Gerald Loeb awards.
He is the author of eleven books, including Den of Thieves, and also the
national best seller, DisneyWar, dealing with Michael Eisner’s
tumultuous reign at Disney. His latest book, Tangled Webs: How False
Statements are Undermining America, examines several recent high
profile cases to show how wrong-doers escape individual responsibility
by invoking the legal concept of the corporation.
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Never forgetting his alma mater, he serves on the Board of
Advisory Trustees at DePauw University and also served as its past
president. In addition, he will be the principal speaker at this year’s
graduation at DePauw University, at which time he will be awarded by
DePauw the Bernard Kilgore medal for distinguished lifetime
achievement in journalism. I could go on and on, but you didn’t come
here to listen to me. Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure to
introduce to you James B. Stewart.
LECTURE: HIDING BEHIND THE CORPORATE VEIL
PROFESSOR STEWART: Thank you very much. What a
wonderful introduction. I did not even know this 100-year anniversary
was coming up, but I am delighted to learn that. This was quite an
unusual opportunity, being invited by a law school to address such a
distinguished audience on the subject of corporate legal issues. At first,
I had a moment of panic thinking what I, a journalist, could possibly say
to you. And I believe I may be the first practicing journalist to give this
lecture, so I’ll just warn you ahead of time that there will be a little more
fact emphasis than there will be legal emphasis. I have enjoyed slipping
back to my legal roots and my legal training to try to weave the two
together, and I have really enjoyed thinking about the subject and
putting this talk together. I have to give special thanks right at the
beginning to two Fordham students who kind of served as my
associates. In fact, they made me feel like something that in life I never
have been: a law firm partner with an array of talented, smart associates
to deploy to do the heavy lifting—and at the same time, keeping the
billable hours down. And so I have to thank Megan Ferrer and Arielle
Buss, who did some tremendous work and legal research for me in
preparing this topic.
There is a guy named Greg Lee, whom you have probably never
heard of. He was the Chief Administrative Officer of the poultry giant,
Tyson Foods, and President of Tyson’s International Unit—one of the
highest-ranking executives in the company. And when he retired, he
could hardly have gotten a better send-off from the company. Here is
what the press release said:
“Greg spent 27 years helping build and grow Tyson Foods, so
his leaving the company will not be easy,” said Dick Bond, Tyson’s
president and CEO. “He will be missed by all, but we take comfort
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in knowing he will still be available on a consulting basis in the
future.”
“My career at Tyson has been rewarding in so many ways,” said
Lee. “It has been exciting to see the company grow from the small
regional chicken company it was when I started, to the largest
protein provider on the planet . . . .”
“The Tyson family greatly appreciates Greg’s dedicated service
to the company over the last three decades,” said Tyson Chairman
John Tyson. “He has been a stalwart team member wherever he was
1
needed and we will miss having him here on a day-to-day basis.”

So Tyson paid Mr. Lee nearly one million dollars on the date of his
retirement and awarded him a ten year consulting contract, which
provided an additional $3.6 million in compensation. Mr. Lee continues
to be reimbursed for his country club dues, use of a company car, and
enjoys, I’m quoting from his employment agreement, “[p]ersonal use of
the Company-owned aircraft for up to one hundred (100) hours per year
for the first five (5) years.”2 As you’ve already heard, the title of my
lecture tonight is “Hiding Behind the Corporate Veil” and exhibit A is
none other than Mr. Lee of Tyson foods. In my opinion, Mr. Lee is
lucky that Tyson Foods is paying his country club dues and not his bail
bond. Exhibits B and C are other high ranking Tyson executives who
conceived, implemented, and even once they were detected, kept alive
one of the most brazen foreign bribery schemes in recent corporate
history. It was a blatant violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.3
Has anyone involved at Tyson been charged with a crime, let alone
convicted of one? No. The Justice Department and the SEC, which
investigated the affair, would not even name the alleged individual
offenders, identifying them only by vague reference to their job
description, such as VP International.4 You are hearing their names
tonight only because I decided to take matters into my own hands and
get to the bottom of what happened. I was able to identify the three top
1. Press Release, Tyson Foods Inc., Greg Lee - Tyson’s Chief Administrative
Officer and International President - Announces Early Retirement (Apr. 3, 2007),
http://www.tysonfoods.com/Media-Room/News-Releases/2007/04/Greg-Lee---Tysons-Chief-Administrative-Officer-and-International-President---Announces-EarlyRetirement.aspx.
2. Tyson Foods Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 3, 2007).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006).
4. Plea Agreement at 14-16, United States v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 11-37 (Feb.
10, 2011).
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executives who, when I contacted them, not surprisingly, declined
comment.
So what actually happened at Tyson? In late June 2004, a plant
manager for one of Tyson Foods’ Mexican poultry processing plants
sent a memo to headquarters in Springville, Arkansas.5 Two women on
Tyson payroll who “most definitely [] [did] not work for Tyson Foods in
Mexico,”6 were being paid over 30,000 pesos a month and had been for
years.7 The Mexican women happened to be the wives of two
veterinarians stationed at the plants as part of the Mexican government’s
efforts to assure high sanitary and processing standards for the Mexican
meat and poultry industries.8 The veterinarians certified the plant’s
products as suitable for export, a step required by countries like Japan
and increasingly sought after by Mexican consumers as well, as an
assurance for quality and safety. By withholding their certifications, the
veterinarians could essentially halt exports of Tyson’s Mexican products
or, as one executive present observed, create “problems at the plants.”9
A few days after this missive, the plant manager’s revelations prompted
a meeting of high-level Tyson executives at headquarters in
Springdale.10 Someone present pointed out the obvious, which was that
the purpose of the payment was to “keep the TIF veterinarians from
making problems.”11 In short, to pay them bribes. All participants at
this meeting, including the then president of Tyson International, whose
name is Greg Huett, the Vice President for Operations, and the Vice
President of Internal Audit, evidently agreed that the payments to the
wives had to stop.12 Around the same time, a company lawyer said he
was seeking advice on the company’s “possible exposure” from the
payments, evidently referring to Tyson’s potential criminal liability for

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 13 (“The Government of Mexico administers an inspection program,
called Tipo Inspección Federal (“TIF”), for meat-processing facilities. Any company
that exports meat products from Mexico must participate in the inspection program,
which is supervised by an office in the Mexican Department of Agriculture
(“SAGARPA”).”).
9. Id. at 15.
10. Id. (“Executive, VP International, VP Audit and others met in Springdale,
Arkansas.”).
11. Id.
12. Id.
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maintaining fraudulent records and bribing foreign officials.13 And then,
having apparently identified the serious legal and illegal lapses, the
potential liability, and the need to stop these bogus payments to the nonworking wives, these high level executives “were tasked with
investigating how to shift the payroll payments to the TIF veterinarians’
wives directly to the veterinarians.”14
A subsequent statement of facts negotiated by Tyson’s lawyers and
the Department of Justice, written in the all too passive voice typical of
these documents, begs the question of just who “tasked” such an
undertaking. A memo written by Tyson’s audit department, titled
“Tyson de Mexico - Payroll Memo,” stated “doctors will submit one
invoice which will include the special payments formerly being made to
their spouses along with there [sic] normal consulting services fees.”15
The invoice for the payments to the veterinarian inspectors would be
labeled as “professional honorarium.”16 The manager of the plant at the
time charged with implementing this new scheme was a manager named
Paul Fox. So I wondered, what were these Tyson executives thinking?
It’s hard to see how simply shifting the payments from the wives to the
veterinarians did anything to mitigate the bribery scheme or the false
descriptions of the payments. If anything, it appears to me even more
brazen. Perhaps once the wives’ cover was blown by the plant manager,
they saw no alternative if the goal was to keep the bribery scheme going.
There is no indication anyone gave serious consideration to stopping the
payments, but only to finding a new way to make them. The President
of International, Mr. Huett, who was the highest-ranking official at the
meeting, communicated this resolution to Tyson’s Chief Administrative
Officer, the Mr. Lee I mentioned earlier.17
So the payments to the veterinarians continued. Another plant
manager subsequently complained to an accountant at Tyson
headquarters that he was uncomfortable with this arrangement.18 The
accountant went to Mr. Huett. “He” meaning Mr. Huett, “agreed that
we are OK to continue to make these payments against invoices (not
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 16 (citing “Tyson de Mexico – Payroll Memo” drafted on or around
August 26, 2004).
16. Id. (“Tyson increased the amount it paid to [a veterinarian] based on invoices
for ‘professional honoraria’ by approximately the same amount that it had previously
paid to the wives of the TIF veterinarians.”).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 17.
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through payroll) until we are able to get [the Mexican inspection
program] to change,” the accountant informed the plant manager.19
Now, Tyson has stressed that none of the products certified by these
Mexican veterinarians taking the bribes ever made it to the US and
apparently no sickness or fatalities have been traced to products
processed at the plants. But such concerns underscore the obvious,
which is why bribing officials charged with protecting the public health
is especially serious.
The issue of these payments resurfaced in November 2006, and this
time, Tyson did what it should have done two years earlier: It retained
an outside law firm, Kirkland and Ellis, which conducted an internal
investigation and, under a government program intended to encourage
voluntary disclosure of white-collar crime, turned the results over to the
Justice Department and the SEC.20 The government’s ensuing multiyear investigation ended last year when Tyson was charged with
conspiracy and violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and agreed
to resolve the charges with a deferred prosecution agreement and pay
the four million dollar criminal penalty.21 The company paid an
additional $1.2 million to settle related SEC charges that it maintained
false books and records and lacked the controls to prevent payments to
phantom employees and government officials.22
But what about those at Tyson responsible for the bribery scheme?
Corporations may have assets and liabilities, but they do not commit
crimes. Their officers, executives, and employees do. And the 23-page
letter agreement between Tyson and the Department of Justice, as well
as the criminal information and the SEC’s public statement of facts, all
withheld any names. It would seem to me self-evident that if Tyson
engaged in a conspiracy and violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
then someone at Tyson did so as well. For violation of the FCPA’s
bribery provisions, individuals can be fined up to $100,000 and

19.
20.

Id. (citing an email sent from Accountant to the plant manager at TdM).
James B. Stewart, Bribery, but Nobody Was Charged, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2011, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/business/25stewart.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
21. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Tyson Foods Inc. Agrees to Pay $4 Million
Criminal Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Allegations (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-crm-171.html.
22. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Tyson Foods with FCPA Violations (Feb.
10, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-42.htm.
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imprisoned for up to five years.23 For books and record violations of the
FCPA, the penalties are fines of up to $5 million and a prison term of up
to twenty years for individuals, and fines of up to $25 million for
companies.24 I assumed the names were withheld because this
investigation was continuing and further charges might be forthcoming.
It turns out I was wrong. The investigation is over, and the SEC and the
Justice Department have said there will be no individual charges.
Companies seem only too willing to go along with this, passing
settlement costs onto shareholders while sweeping the details and even
the names under the rug. Gary Mickelson, a Tyson spokesman, declined
to name any company officials involved when I asked him, but he said,
“they’re either no longer with the company or they were disciplined.”25
He declined to be more specific and I wondered just how exactly they
were “disciplined.”
So how have these individuals fared, the ones I identified by
additional reporting? Tyson announced in May 2006 that Greg Huett,
the President of International, whom my research shows was heavily
involved in the scheme, would be named to “another leadership position
within the company.”26 SEC filings indicate he left in 2007 without any
further comment from Tyson. He is currently a director of publicly
traded YUHE International, China’s largest producer of day-old broiler
chickens, where he serves on the Audit and Compensation committees,
and chairs the Nominating Committee.27 Paul Fox, the Mexican plant
manager, was actually promoted by Tyson to Vice President, Processed
Meats Operation and left a year later to become the Chief Executive of
Dickinson’s Frozen Foods in Idaho. He then became a Managing
Director of Brazil-based Marfrig Group, one of the world’s largest meat
and poultry producers, and currently serves as the Chief Executive
Officer of O.K. Industries, an integrated chicken producer. And of
course, Mr. Lee got the glowing sendoff and the lucrative consulting

23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §
2C1.1 (2011), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2011_Guidelines/Manual_
HTML/2c1_1.htm.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
25. Stewart, supra note 21.
26. Press Release, Tyson Foods, Inc., Tyson Selects International Group Vice
President; Other Management Changes Announced (May 23, 2006),
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tyson-selects-international-group-vicepresident-other-management-changes-announced-56525442.html.
27. YUHE Int’l Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 13, 2008).
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contract along with other perks like use of the company plane.28 When I
called for comment, everyone said this was the end of it and they felt
that the settlement had largely achieved the government’s objectives,
which were to stop the illegal conduct at Tyson and deter future
instances. But surely bribery, not to mention other forms of corporate
wrongdoing, would be more effectively deterred if some individual was
actually held accountable for it.
Where has this idea come from? That somehow corporations in the
abstract can commit crimes? Slowly but surely, the corporation has
been anthropomorphized by American common and statutory law as
much as any Disney movie has produced talking animals and birds. As
far back as 1819 in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,29 the
Supreme Court ruled that a corporation, like a person, could enter into
an enforceable contract. In 1830, another Supreme Court case granted
corporations the same property rights as those enjoyed by natural
persons.30 From there, the corporation was on a slippery slope to fullblown personhood. As a matter of interpretation of the word “person”
in the Fourteenth Amendment, US courts have extended many, although
not all, constitutional protections to corporations. And since the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission31 in 2010, upholding the corporation’s right to make
unlimited political expenditures as an exercise of First Amendment
protected speech, many have begun to wonder if this trend has gone too
far.32
That’s a separate issue from my talk tonight. Still, the fictional
notion that the corporation has the rights to enter into contracts, to own
property, and to engage in other activities customarily associated with
actual people, was quite slow to become embedded in the notion of
criminal law. Many wondered how an abstract entity, a collective of
people, could act with a specific criminal intent necessary for
commission of a crime. But especially as the notion of vicarious
28.
29.
30.

Tyson Foods Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 3, 2007).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
Soc’y for the Propogation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Pawlett, 29 U.S. (4
Pet.) 480 (1830).
31. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
32. For an overview of the arguments against corporate personhood, see Susanna
Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights after Citizens United: An Analysis of
the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 209 (2011).
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corporate liability and tort law expanded to cover corporate liability, in
large part because of the deep pockets and generous recoveries that
could often be obtained from corporations, criminal liability for
corporate persons followed. In 1909, the Supreme Court ruled in United
States v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co.,33 that
corporate criminal sanctions could be imposed if an employee had
committed a crime, first, within the scope of his or her employment and
second, for the benefit of the corporation. That standard is still widely
applied today. And finally, the very first section of the US Code, Title
1, Section 1 states that the word “person” includes “corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies and joint stock
companies,” as well as individuals.”34 At this point, the personhood of
the corporation is complete.
Even so, the notion that corporations might commit crimes seems
to have been largely seen as something that supplemented, rather than
supplanted, individual liability. In other words, individuals would be
charged with crimes and then, on top of that, the corporation might also
be held liable, in many cases, in order to collect financial damages for
victims. That has changed relatively recently. Ironically, in the wake
of major criminal scandals over the last two decades, starting with Enron
and WorldCom, and continuing through the financial crisis, criminal
investigations seem to have increased significantly, but convictions have
not. In the five years following Enron, only one major company,
accounting firm Arthur Anderson, was actually convicted of a crime,
and even that was subsequently overturned, although not in time to save
the firm.35 Numerous individuals have been prosecuted and quite a few
convicted, many of them, however, quite low on the corporate scale.
And recently, even that trend seems to have diminished, with very few
individuals being held accountable for corporate wrongdoing. This
appears in large part to be due to policies embraced in Washington by
the Justice Department and the SEC, which favor deferred prosecution
agreements such as that with Tyson.
As the Tyson case indicates, the corporation itself rarely has any
interest in seeing its executives brought to justice, particularly when
33.
34.

212 U.S. 509 (1909).
1 U.S.C. § 1 (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals.”).
35. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Unanimously Overturn Conviction of Arthur
Andersen, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/31/business/
31wire-andersen.html?pagewanted=all.
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those executives might be at the very top of the hierarchy, including the
CEO. Now, why this would be the case is not entirely self-evident, at
least to me, especially since their behavior has often brought tremendous
embarrassment and financial damage to the institution they were
purporting to serve. But I believe there is a clue in the Tyson accolades
for Mr. Lee, and the reference to him being a wonderful “team player.”36
In my experience, there seems to be no higher accolade in corporate
America than being called a “team player” or even a “TP,” as I’ve
sometimes heard it abbreviated. A “TP” displays a quality much prized
by many organizations, which is loyalty—a quality prized far too much,
in my view. Loyalty is often elevated to the top of the ethical pyramid,
above the rule of law, and the obligation to obey the law. “Loyalty
above all” is essentially the code of organized crime. This is hardly
limited to corporations, as scandals at Penn State and the Catholic
Church have demonstrated, but it does seem to be particularly attractive
within the corporate context.
This impulse also extends to behavior that may be scandalous even
though it may not reach the level of criminal conduct. A vivid recent
example occurred at the Hewlett-Packard Company, the world’s largest
computer maker. Let me read an excerpt from a remarkable letter from
a lawyer that landed on the desk of Hewlett-Packard’s then Chief
Executive, Mark Hurd. And by the way, then tell me whether you think
corporate law is boring. Here is the quote:
[She] was scared. She was a nervous wreck but attempted to
appear relaxed. She sat down on one of two loveseats in the sitting
room. She was worried when you came over and sat directly next to
her and put your arm on the back of the loveseat. As you did so,
your hand brushed across her breast. It happened a second time and
[she] said, “you know that you are touching my breast, right?” You
37
said, “oh, sorry, sorry” and then laughed it off.

This is a passage from the letter that triggered one of the most
remarkable sagas in modern boardroom history and cost Mark Hurd his
position as Chief Executive of Hewlett-Packard. A year and a half after
this letter landed on his desk, the question persists – how much of it is

36.
37.

Press Release, Tyson Foods Inc., supra note 1.
Letter from Gloria Allred, Attorney, Allred, Maroko & Goldberg, to Mark
Hurd, CEO, Hewlett Packard Co. (June 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2011/12/30/business/30hurd-letter.html [hereinafter Allred Letter].
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fiction? It’s written in a breathless narrative style by Gloria Allred, the
high profile lawyer who represents former H-P consultant, Jodie Fisher,
the woman who is the “she” in the excerpt I read. The letter was
unsealed recently by the Delaware Supreme Court after Mr. Hurd
intervened in impending shareholder litigation in an effort to keep it
secret. The letter is, to the best of my knowledge, unprecedented in the
annals of boardroom history. It purports to convey explicit dialogue,
“[s]o, you’ll stay the night, right? You’ll stay?”38 It explores the
characters’ inner thoughts and states of mind, even Mr. Hurd’s. “You
were outraged and felt insulted by [Ms. Fisher’s publicist] and by Ms.
Fisher,”39 “[s]he felt tired, irritated and depressed, sad and mad. . . .”40 It
contains brand name details in glamorous foreign locations. “You went
in a town car from the [Ritz] hotel to Combarro Restaurant in
Madrid.”41 And then it employs rarely used second person narration,
consistently referring to Mr. Hurd as “you.” In this regard, it joins
bestsellers like Jay McInerney’s “Bright Lights, Big City,” and Terry
McMillan’s “Waiting to Exhale,” as well as classic works by Nathaniel
Hawthorne and John Updike. I have to congratulate Ms. Allred. It’s
one of the few legal documents I can honestly describe as a page-turner.
But stripped of its literary flourishes, it boils down to an alleged twoyear campaign by Mr. Hurd to have sex with Jodie Fisher, a former softcore movie actress who H-P hired as a consultant to help host so-called
executive summit events for the company.
In the course of those years, Ms. Fisher alleges Mr. Hurd let his
hand brush against her breast, asked her to spend the night with him,
asked her to hug him—and did hug her while she was dressed in a
robe—once put his arms around her and “quickly kissed [her] on the
lips,” asked her to go away with him, and said he could spend the rest of
his life with her.42 She mentioned several occasions when they were
alone together in his or her hotel room, unrelated to any alleged
executive summit meeting, and where they sometimes chatted about
movies and sports. She insists she rebuffed all these approaches, there
was no sexual activity, and as a result, her consulting contract was not
extended. Abruptly dropping the role of omniscient narrator, Ms. Allred

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4, 6.
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then concludes that Mr. Hurd’s behavior amounted to “the most
egregious type of sexual harassment.”43
Taken as true, Ms. Fisher’s allegations do seem to meet the
threshold for sexual harassment in California, which is “verbal, visual or
physical conduct of a sexual nature or of a hostile nature based on
gender that were unwelcome and pervasive or severe.”44 But Mr. Hurd
wasn’t asked to resign for sexual harassment and it’s not clear that the
key elements of Ms. Fisher’s allegations are true. She settled the matter
and promptly shattered her credibility by conceding that the letter
contained “many inaccuracies” without specifying what they are.45 She
has since declined comment as she did when I tried to reach her.
Putting the details aside, to believe Ms. Fisher, you have to accept
her claims that Mr. Hurd, a married Chief Executive of a Fortune 500
company, who by her account had plenty of other women at his
disposal,46 pursued her for two years while being constantly rebuffed.
And emails from her to Mr. Hurd suggest that whatever transpired
between the two of them, Mr. Hurd’s attentions were hardly unwelcome,
which is a critical element of any sexual harassment claim. H-P
commissioned an outside law firm, Covington and Burling, to
investigate Ms. Fisher’s allegations. And while it “did not show that
Hurd had committed sexual harassment”, it “did reveal that Hurd had
breached H-P’s standards of business conduct,” according to a summary
by the Delaware Supreme Court. In a letter to H-P employees at the
time of his dismissal, H-P’s then interim Chief Executive, Catherine
Lesjak, said Mr. Hurd “failed to disclose a close personal relationship he
had with [a] contractor, [which] constituted a conflict of interest, failed
to maintain accurate expense reports, and misused company assets.”47
But at least four expense reports do list Ms. Fisher as being present.
And the Allred letter cites frequent occasions when Mr. Hurd’s assistant
dealt with Ms. Fisher as well as numerous meetings where Ms. Fisher
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 7.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.9 (West 2012).
Aaron Ricadela, Former HP CEO Hurd Tried to Cajole Fisher into Sex, Letter
Says, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 30, 2011) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-29/hurdpursued-sex-with-contractor-jodie-fisher-while-ceo-of-hp-letter-says.html.
46. See Allred Letter at 5.
47. Thom Holwerda, HP CEO Mark Hurd Resigns after Inappropriate Behaviour,
OSNEWS (Aug. 6, 2010, 10:15 PM), http://www.osnews.com/story/23659/HP_CEO_
Mark_Hurd_Resigns_After_Inappropriate_Behaviour/.
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did indeed perform the hostess services for which she was hired and got
“immediate and incredibly positive feedback from everyone” as she
wrote in another email. This hardly seems like concealment.
So why did H-P dismiss Mr. Hurd? Sticking to only the undisputed
facts, there’s plenty of evidence that Mr. Hurd exercised dubious
judgment, starting with the decision to hire a soft-core film actress as a
facilitator at cocktail parties in the first place. Ms. Fisher notes in her
letter that she always flew first-class at a time when nearly all other H-P
employees were consigned to coach and under orders to cut travel
expenses. No Chief Executive should spend time alone in a hotel room
with a low-level employee or consultant of either sex, without a good
reason, even if all they do is watch sports on TV.
Other possibilities must be confronted. When the board concluded
that Mr. Hurd did not engage in sexual harassment, it may have been
because he didn’t do any of the things that Ms. Fisher alleged. The
other possibility is that Ms. Fisher is lying, that she consented to his
advances and indeed that they had a prolonged, consensual affair. As I
mentioned, under California Law, consent obviates any charge of sexual
harassment.
Those familiar with the board’s thinking have told me that board
members felt that Mr. Hurd had committed a fundamental breach of
trust that could not be repaired. When questioned about his relationship
with Ms. Fisher, board members felt Mr. Hurd was not forthcoming.
The final straw came when he settled Ms. Fisher’s allegations, acting on
his own initiative and paying her just over one million dollars from his
pocket, little more than twenty-four hours before H-P lawyers were
scheduled to meet with her to review the evidence.
Now that’s what they told me. Shareholders have never been told
this. Did any of this warrant Mr. Hurd’s dismissal? H-P’s revenues,
profits and share price soared under his leadership and he was widely
hailed as one of the country’s most effective corporate Chief
Executives.48
The fateful step to dismiss him had enormous
consequences for H-P shareholders and plunged H-P into a period of
protracted management turmoil. It seems to have been calmed only

48. James B. Stewart, Ouster of Hewlett-Packard C.E.O. Is Expected: Most Voted
to Hire Apotheker Without Meeting Him, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2011, at B1, available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/business/voting-to-hire-a-chief-withoutmeeting-him.html (“Mr. Hurd pulled off one of the great rescue missions in American
corporate history, refocusing the strife-ridden company and leading it to five years of
revenue gains and a stock that soared 130 percent.”).
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recently by the appointment of Meg Whitman as Chief Executive.49 The
Delaware Supreme Court didn’t seem to make much of Ms. Allred’s
allegations, characterizing them as “embarrassing” to Mr. Hurd, but
agreeing with the trial court that Ms. Allred’s letter should be
unsealed.50 Or was Mr. Hurd’s behavior so serious that he should have
been fired for “cause,” which would have enabled H-P to deny him his
$12.2 million severance package? That’s the subject of ongoing
litigation, with several pending shareholder suits alleging it was the
board’s responsibility to do so.51 These questions are tough to answer
without access to information and documents the board considered in
making its decision, such as the Covington Report. Curiously, H-P itself
initially agreed to file the Allred letter under seal and it has refused to
produce the Covington report, invoking the attorney-client privilege.
While it’s easy to understand why Mr. Hurd would not want this
material made public, it’s hard to understand why H-P would care,
assuming that the documents indeed support the board’s decision to
terminate him, but not for cause.
If H-P wants to put all this behind it and dispel the perception that it
had something to hide, it should waive the attorney-client privilege and
make public all the relevant materials, especially since as the Delaware
Court suggests, they’re likely to become public eventually anyway. As
is too often the case in such corporate battles, the biggest losers in all
this are the shareholders. They’re the plaintiffs in the various
shareholder suits and H-P is spending their money to defend its board
and ironically Mr. Hurd, since he’s indemnified under his former
employment agreement. H-P shares, which were trading at $46.50 on
the day of Ms. Allred’s letter, were at $23.46 today.52
If Ms. Fisher’s allegations are fundamentally false, Mr. Hurd has
been subjected to needless and unfair embarrassment, an unwarranted
invasion of privacy, and scurrilous allegations. But his marriage has
49. Mifa Kim, Whitman’s Top Job: Restore HP Credibility, Jumpstart Growth,
INT’L BUS. TIMES (NOV. 23, 2011, 1:35 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/whitmans-topjob-restore-hp-credibility-jumpstart-growth-651901.
50. See Hurd v. Espinoza, 34 A.3d 1084, 1086 (Del. 2011).
51. See, e.g., Zucker v. Andreessen, C.A. No. 6014-VCP, 2012 WL 2366448 (Del.
Ch. June 21, 2012). At the time of this speech, this lawsuit was ongoing; however, in
June of this year, the Court ruled in favor of Defendants (including H-P) based on the
Plaintiff’s failure to plead demand futility.
52. Historical Quote for HPQ, MARKET WATCH, http://www.marketwatch.com/
investing/stock/hpq/historical (last visited Oct. 6, 2012).
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survived, he got his severance and he’s now president of Oracle, which
seems unfazed by whatever happened at H-P.53 And Ms. Fisher, though
she claims to have been “emotionally debilitated” and “spiraling
downwards” at the time she wrote her letter, walks away with a sevenfigure settlement, far more than she could ever have hoped for as an H-P
hostess or, for that matter, a “B” movie actress.
In my view the corporate law is woefully inadequate in mandating
disclosure of material information to shareholders, whether they involve
criminal conduct, embarrassing conduct, or the reason for an executive’s
termination. They pay constant lip service to the notion of corporate
democracy and shareholder rights. But courts have consistently
declined to extend the notion of materiality to the actual reasons for
executive removal. It’s deemed enough for shareholders to know that
someone has been ousted and replaced.
Shareholders cannot make meaningful decisions as to who should
be elected to their boards of directors without adequate information with
which to adequately judge their performance. And in many cases, they
are getting misleading—if not outright false—statements. This often
happens in the case of “resignations,” surely one of the most abused
words in the corporate cannon. Tyson may not have overtly lied in
announcing Mr. Lee’s “retirement,” but it certainly omitted material
information, that he was being forced to resign as part of a deferred
prosecution agreement with the government, something that should have
sent him to the exit in disgrace, rather than with the use of the corporate
jet. And shareholders shouldn’t have had to rely on a reporter to tell
them that.
The Hurd case is even more significant because the decision to hire
and fire a CEO is surely one of the most important decisions a corporate
board makes. Yet, how can shareholders evaluate such actions if they’re
deprived of the basis for knowing why an action was taken? H-P’s
sudden ousting of Mark Hurd accompanied by patently insincere, if not
outright false explanations caused the stock to plunge, triggered a hasty
and ultimately disastrous search for a successor, and it’s caused billions

53. Aaron Ricadela, Oracle Hires Ex-HP CEO Hurd as President as Phillips
Departs, BLOOMBERG.COM (Sept. 7, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2010-09-07/mark-hurd-joins-oracle-as-president-after-leaving-hp-as-phillipsresigns.html.
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of dollars in shareholder losses.54 It is no wonder there are multiple
shareholder lawsuits still working their way through the courts.
What can be done about this state of affairs? At the investigative
and prosecutorial level, there must be a high-level recognition that
whatever the evolution of the statutory and common law, corporations in
fact are not people. Punishing shareholders for corporate wrongdoings
does little or nothing to deter future unlawful conduct. Witness the
blatant recidivism of Citibank and other major banks recently
documented in a front page New York Times article that describes scores
of repeated sanctions and warnings not to repeat illegal behavior that fell
upon deaf ears.55
In my view, deferred prosecution agreements are simply a lazy and
inexpensive way, eagerly embraced by corporations for obvious reasons,
for individuals to evade accountability and to sweep corporate
wrongdoing under the rug. They should be curtailed, if not halted
altogether. Judges—especially those in Delaware who handle the bulk
of corporate cases—also in my view need to take a much broader view,
especially about requiring corporations to disclose misconduct by highlevel officials when it is potentially criminal or results in an executive’s
termination. The SEC should simply not allow companies to announce
that their executives have “resigned” when these resignations aren’t
voluntary.
Corporations are undoubtedly one of the most effective and
extraordinary creations of modern society. But by insulating individuals
from the consequences of their behavior, they pose systemic risk, as we
have seen just recently with the financial crisis. Americans are hungry
for accountability and thus far, they have seen very little of it.
Corporate law could play a major role in restoring public confidence in
markets, corporations, and the economy, if it returns to its roots in the
public interest and stops doing the bidding of the wealthy and powerful
entities it is called upon to regulate.

54. Hewlett-Packard Shares DROP after CEO’s Forced Resignation, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 9, 2010, 6:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/09/hewlettpackard-shares-dr_n_675576.html.
55. Edward Wyatt, Promises Made, then Broken, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/
business/in-sec-fraud-cases-banks-make-and-break-promises.html.

